Title: The Good, the Bad, and the Rich: Routing selfish, class-conscious, andmalicious users on traffic networks

Recently there has been great interest in the Computer Science community for the study of selfish routing on a network. "Selfish" means that the users (the Good) of the network are uncoordinated; instead, they try to minimize their routing cost, without caring about the effect their decisions may have on the overall performance or on the other players. This setting is game-theoretic in nature, and it may eventually lead to an equilibrium. Such `traffic equilibria' have been studied for a long time in the OR community, but we are particularly interested in the comparison between a coordinated vs. an uncoordinated network. We will present a classic formulation of traffic equilibria as solutions to a complementarity problem by Aashtiani & Magnianti, and then we will show how one can extend this formulation to model malicious users (the Bad), and how to use taxation (class warfare) to lure the users towards a prescribed flow pattern.
This is joint work with Anastasios Viglas, and Stavros Kolliopoulos.